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considers adverse shifts in final demand as a form of technological change 
then the firms experiencing this shift hâve no profits whatsoever for 
providing assistance, i.e. as in coal mining. 
CONCLUSION 
If nothing else, thèse comments on an altered collective bargaining 
process should raise serious questions as to what results the right to re-
open and strike will hâve. It certainly is not évident that a change in the 
bargaining process is going to yield a pronounced increase in worker 
protection. But even granted that it does it is not clear eut that thèse 
gains will exceed the costs arising from the instability and uncertainty 
created. In effect we may be seriously impairing the collective bargaining 
process, which works well for other issues, in order to make questionable 
and marginal gains in the area of adjustment to change, an issue perhaps 
not suited to the collective bargaining process. If adjustment to tech-
nological change is truly a serious social issue it should not be attacked 
indirectly through some process that yields uncertain benefits and almost 
certainly some costs. Surely, David killed Goliath with a small slingshot 
but one cannot be confident that this outeome would always occur. 
Some Comments on the Task Force on 
Labour Relations, Freedman, and Reopeners : 
A Reply to David P. Ross 
H. D. WOODS 
David P. Ross in his article published in this issue, is critical of the 
Report of the Task Force on Labour Relations with regard to its recom-
mendations for dealing with the problem of technological change. This 
answering comment is the sole responsibility of the writer and in no way 
is it to be taken to express the views of other members of the Task Force. 
With much of what Ross says there can be no serious quarrel and indeed 
a large part of this article is not inconsistent with the Task Force Report. 
However, he seems to hâve misread or misunderstood the intention of 
the recommendations in the report dealing with industrial conversion, the 
term used in the report to encompass technological change. 
Ross is at great pains to find some justification for public assumption 
of some responsibility for resolving the impact of technological displace-
ment. He states : « If government is committed to stimulating the gains 
from technological change, should it not then be partially responsible for 
the losses ? » 
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This is a strange argument. It places a responsibility on the govern-
ment because the government has been engagea in stimulating the eco-
nomy. Presumably then the government would not hâve any responsibility 
to the man displaced through technological change which could not be 
related to the govemment's involvement in stimulating change and a high 
level of économie activity or économie growth. One might equally argue 
that government has no responsibility to supply educational services to 
its citizens unless it can be shown that the illiteracy of children is in some 
manner caused by government activities. To the employed man it would 
make no différence whether the government was bearish or bullish to-
ward the economy. If he is a victim of technological change, he needs 
help. The Task Force made no allocation of responsibility but did recog-
nize a primary rôle for public in three areas ; more emphasis on éducation 
for adjustment ; a high level of employment ; and an active labour market 
policy to facilitate mobility. Ail of this was related to the needs of the 
victims of technological change. And the important issue is how thèse 
needs can be met most efficiently, taking into account the relationship 
between technological change and the social goal of a rising standard 
of living. The Task Force report gives the major rôle to public authorities 
and public programs without absolving ithe private parties entirely. It 
recognizes a place for collective bargaining. 
Ross recognizes three board approaches to the solution to the prob-
lem of technological change and its impact on employées. The first is to 
change the législative context within which bargaining takes places in 
the hope that the private parties will be encouraged to solve the problem 
by negotiation. The second approach is to recognize that collectively bar-
gained solutions are not applicable to ail workers and therefofre public 
intervention is required to impose standards and minimum assistance 
provisions for ail. In other words the private parties should be told what 
they must do. The third would emphasize public assistance by offering 
compensation after the private sector has made ail its décisions. As Ross 
points out, the Task Force report supports the use of ail three. It is the 
particular proposai made by the Task Force under the umbrella of his 
first board approach — change the législation to encourage the parties 
to résolve the difficulties themselves — that draws his fire if criticism, 
and which in the opinion of this writer he seems to hâve misunderstood. 
Before examining his criticisms it is necessary to draw attention to Ross' 
misstatement of the Freedman report. 
Ross makes the statement : « Justice Freedman has recommended 
postponing major changes until the open period of the agreement ». This 
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is not strictly correct since the Freedman Report recommended only that, 
if an arbitrator ruled that the proposed innovation was a major one, the 
employer could introduce the change if he got the union's approval. In 
other words, Freedman did not recommend a bar on ail major change 
during the life of an agreement, but he did propose to give the union a 
veto on such changes. Under his proposai, it would hâve been possible 
for a union to permit a major change, perhaps only in return for some-
thing desired by the union as a quid pro quo. Freedman provided for 
negotiation but with the strike sanction transformed into a union veto 
sanction. The Task Force expressed serious doubts about the value of 
the gênerai application of the Freedman formula and instead chose to 
support policies which would protect management in its freedom to make 
changes which in themselves are not in violation of a collective agree-
ment, place the major responsibility on government agencies, and retain 
a rôle for collective bargaining. The report states : « within the public 
policy framework we recommend, collective bargaining could play a cons-
tructive supplementary rôle by helping to adapt public policies to parti-
cular situation. Until such a framework (of public policy) is completed, 
collective bargaining must perforée play an even greater part in developing 
appropriate adjustment procédures and approaches >. It is this continuing 
rôle for collective bargaining and the proposais to give the parties the 
power to break out of the législative straight-jacket in which they are 
now encased under the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation 
Act which Ross finds objectionable. His attack on the reopening proposai 
contains nine points. Thèse require examination. 
Ross' contention that there is nothing at présent to prohibit unions 
from including in agreements, programs for adjusting workers to techno-
logical displacement is correct, but this information in no way diminishes 
the value of the proposai. The Task Force recommendation did not propose 
that the présent barrier to strike action during the life of an agreement 
should be eliminated, but that the law should be relaxed to permit the 
parties mutually to opt out of this restraint at the time the collective 
agreement is negotiated. The proposai would give to the employer con-
fronted with a union demand during negotiations for an industrial conver-
sion clause three options ; he could grant the requested clause to the 
union ; he could deny the request and offer to agrée to a reopener on 
the conversion issue and take his chance on a strike during the life of 
the agreement ; or he could grant neither and run the risk that the issue 
of conversion either by itself or along with other rejected demands would 
bring on a strike directly. The union on the other side of the table would 
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be concerned with the same options. Those employers who wanted to 
maximize certainty would probably choose to negotiate a clause covering 
the conversion issue and thus préserve the no-strike provision of the law. 
Those who preferred to avoid spécifie commitments in advance might be 
prepared to accept a reopener and negotiation clause and the possibility 
of a strike. Those strongly opposed either to a substantive provision in 
advance or a procédural commitment to negotiate in a context of a strike 
possibility if the issue emerged during the life of the agreement could take 
such a position and take a chance on a strike in the interest bargaining 
period. The existence of thèse options would in fact assist collective bar-
gaining because of the increase in the number of alternative settlements 
available. The Task Force saw this provision as an additional instrument 
in the hands of a conciliation officer confronted with a strong demand 
from a union for protection from the impact of technological change 
during the life of the agreement. It was fully aware that the law now 
permits a union to strike during the negotiation period to force an em-
ployer to accept obligations regarding industrial conversion possibilities, 
but it reasoned that considering the nature of the problem itself, there 
would be an advantage to granting the parties the option by agreement to 
transform bargaining in advance for a solution to problems yet unknown 
to ad hoc negotiations when the substantive issue was itself on the table. 
Ross supports his position by suggesting pension bargaining as an 
analogy to bargaining over the possibility of technological change. The 
analogy it false. Pension plans are instruments for distributing income 
over the working lives of employées and on throughout the retirement 
years as well. It can be based on actuarial principles and relates to ail 
employées who survive to the retirement period. The impact of industrial 
conversion is an insurance against the adversities flowing from manage-
rial décisions and is critical for those directly victimized. It may never 
be applied to considérable numbers of the work force. Furthermore, 
management controls the changes involved as to kind and timing. Because 
of this and the impossibility of knowing what technologies may become 
available after an agreement is signed, the level of uncertainty is high. 
The justification of reopening and renegotiation still stands. 
The statement by Ross that « The real purpose of the reopener of 
course is simply to give the union an increase in bargaining power » is 
largely answered in the foregoing analysis. The real purpose is to give 
the parties alternatives not now available to them, in the belief that they 
will engage in serious and realistic bargaining. 
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Ross misimderstands the recommendation when he suggests that it 
attempts « to influence the outcome of private bargaining...» Again 
as already explained, the proposai is procédural and does not in any way 
steer the negotiation in a given direction, with the exception that it might 
very well reduce industrial tensions and strikes - either légal or illégal -
by providing the additional alternatives to the strike. 
The statement that « technological change is an important term of 
work that merits spécial considération » calling for spécial législation 
affecting bargaining procédures is correct, but the conclusion that this 
logically justifies solving the problem by additions to industrial standards 
législation is a non-sequitor which indicates a lack of understanding of the 
rôle of collective bargaining in our industrial relations System. One of 
the virtues of collective bargaining it that it allows the private parties to 
design their own standards to suit their own spécifie needs. Of course 
there may be a case for public standards of insurance against the impact 
of change, but it does not follow directly from the fact of a serious dis-
placement problem. Such législation would be hard to resign simply 
because it might be much too blunt an instrument to apply generally, as 
the Fédéral hours of work standards hâve been found to be. Perhaps the 
combination of public programs and collective bargaining is safer. The 
recently announced Fédéral program for the rationalization of the textile 
industry at first glance looks like an imaginative straw in the wind. Pushing 
Ross to the logical conclusion of his argument, collective bargaining 
would become unnecessary because we hâve minimum wage laws, hours 
législation, holiday and vacation standard, and so on. There is much 
overlapping of public requirement and private agreement areas, and there 
probably will continue to be as long as our libéral démocratie pluralistic 
System continues. More specifically spécial législation or procédures in 
collective bargaining is needed for the conversion problem because the 
disturbing changes émerge into view after the right to negotiate bas been 
temporarily lost and frozen into the agreement. 
Ross next, by an hypothetical example, demonstrates that; an em-
ployer who signs an agreement at a given point in time and later has it 
reoponed may be confronted with an increased cost which he had a right 
not to expect. A marginal employer could be forced out of business. But 
surely this ignores a number of realities. If an employer should, under 
the Task Force's proposed formula, agrée to a possible reopener on 
technological change he would, as a prudent bar gainer calculate the 
probable cost conséquences of the reopener and attempt to adjust the total 
cost package accordingly. It is true it would be partly guesswork unless 
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he had ail his conversion plans well worked out for the duration of the 
agreement. The worst that could happen to him would be the abandon-
nant of his plan to introduce change because of the anticipated cost of 
avoiding a strike or of the expected strike itself. Business men are usually 
pretty good at this kind of calculation. 
While it is true that an employer hopes to buy peace with the agree-
ment, he can do so by agreeing in advance to a union request for a 
protective clause. But the employée who faces the calamity of redundancy 
has no recourse unless there is a bargained redundancy compensation of 
some sort, or a right of his union during the life of the agreement to 
negotiate and even strike on his behalf. Ross' mathematical illustration 
fails to take this logical behaviour of the employer as negotiator into 
account. 
In what he calls the « fallacy of reopening for one item » Ross 
points to package deal bargaining. But this ignores the facts. In the first 
place, as pointed out above, the employer probably had included the 
anticipated cost in the original bargaining. Secondly, technological innova-
tion is normally introduced as a cost réduction move which may mean 
that it can carry the redundancy cost without difficulty. A lock at the 
expérience of the United States west coast longshoring industry expérience 
is impressive in this regard. 
The argument that it might be better to accept the United States 
policy and remove the no-strike and no-lockout clause and the arbitration 
clause from the I.R.D.I. Act and similar provincial laws has much merit 
and the Task Force did give it serious considération. It was rejected partly 
because of the deeply entrenched attitudes in this country among em-
ployers, many unions, and government officiais in favour of the com-
pulsory prohibition of the strike and lockout during the term of an 
agreement, and the strong sentiments in favour of compulsory arbitration 
of right disputes. But more important was the récognition of the timing 
of the introduction of change in relation to the time séquence of collective 
bargaining and the agreement. 
In this respect it might be worth noting that the essence of the 
proposai of the Task Force has been included in the Nova Scotia Trade 
Union Act for many years. Section 23 (2) permits a strike or lockout 
over any contractually agreed reopener provided the necessary conciliation 
steps hâve been taken. The Task Force was not being particularly original 
in its proposai. It merely recommended that the Fédéral Act be relaxed 
with regard to the one issue. 
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The other arguments are not very significant. Partly they are based 
on the belief, already attached in this comment, that the members of the 
Task Force were attempting to give direction to the results of collective 
bargaining. Thus Ross states : « There is no guarantee that the negotiated 
technological change provision will strive to be efficient». Of course 
there isn't, but there is a possibility that the opening up of alternatives 
will produce results more satisfactory to the parties of interest and with 
less frustration and illégal strike action than will flow from the présent 
absolute prohibition of the strike and lockout and the imposition of 
compulsory arbitration including the restraint of non-arbitrability. Every 
bargaining area could be prohibited by législation if the only needed 
justification were that there is no guarantee that the negotiated provision 
has striven to be efficient. Wage rates, seniority provisions, job posting 
and the whole gamut of substantive provisions of an agreement could be 
attaked under Ross' notion. The essence of collective bargaining is the 
freedom of the parties to agrée to their own heaven or hell with as little 
public constraint as possible. It is in that context that the reopener 
proposai should be judged. 
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